In light of recent market moves I wanted to revisit this post about discount rates and how they might impact valuation multiples (spoiler: it’s an inverse relationship). I think the post holds up pretty well. The key feature was this chart:
Recall that there’s an inverse relationship between the discount rate and the multiple you should pay for an earnings stream. The discount rate has two components:
1) a riskfree interest rate representing the time value of money (usually proxied by a long-term government bond yield), and
2) a “risk premium” meant to account for things like economic sensitivity, corporate leverage and the inherent uncertainty surrounding the future.
Back in January I wrote:
By way of anecdotal evidence, sentiment is getting more and more bullish. Every day I am reading articles about the possibility of a market “melt-up.” If the market melts up it may narrow the implied risk premium and further reduce the implied discount rate. If this occurs, it leaves investors even more exposed to a double whammy: simultaneous spikes in both the riskfree interest rate and the risk premium. The years 1961 to 1980 on the chart give you an idea of how destructive a sustained increase in the discount rate can be to equity valuations.
I am reminded of this as I read this post from Josh Brown, featuring the below chart:
Taken together, this is a fairly vivid illustration of why the current level of corporate earnings matters far less than long-run expectations for margins, growth, and (perhaps most importantly) the discount rate.
(You do remember what’s happening with interest rates, don’t you?)
Assuming no growth, a perpetual earnings stream of $1 is worth $20 discounted at 5%.
Raise that discount rate to 10% and the same earnings stream is worth $10.
Raise it to 15% and the value falls below $7.
And so on.
Now, there’s no way to reliably predict what the discount rate will look like over time. The real world is not as simple as my stylized example. On top of that the discount rate is not something we can observe directly. The best we can do is try to back into some estimate based on current market prices and consensus expectations for corporate earnings.
So, what’s the point of the exercise?
First, I don’t think it’s unreasonable to expect some mean reversion when the estimated discount rate seems to lie at an extreme value. And yes, I counted short-term rates at zero percent as “extreme.” As the above attribution chart clearly demonstrates, multiple contraction can be quite painful.
Second, this should explicitly inform your forward-looking return expectations. Generally speaking, the higher the implied discount rate, the higher your implied future returns. There is good economic sense behind this. “Discount rate” in this context is synonymous with “implied IRR.” To look at a 5% implied IRR and expect a 20% compound return as your base case makes no economic sense. Assuming the implied IRR is reasonably accurate, the only way that happens is if you sell the earnings stream to a greater fool at a stupidly inflated price.
Do fools buy things at irrationally high prices?
Yes. Indisputably. All the time.
Does that make price speculation a sound investment strategy?
No, it does not.
“Multiple expansion” is just a fancy way of saying “speculative price increase.”
Likewise, “multiple contraction” is a fancy was of saying “speculative price decline.”