ET Note: On The Great Jihad And Other Possible Futures

dune_pic

My latest note for Epsilon Theory is about possible futures. And Dune.

One of the recurring images in the book is what we in finance know as a probability tree. In the world of Dune, if you are at least a little bit psychic, and you amplify that psychic ability with a generous helping of hallucinogenic “spice,” you can catch a glimpse of the branching probability tree that is the as-yet-unrealized future.

Here in the investment and financial advice businesses, we, too, seem to have reached an evolutionary crossroads. I don’t claim to know exactly what the industry will look like in ten or twenty years. But like Dune‘s protagonist, Paul Atreides, I think I can peer through the haze of a spice trance to glimpse some of the branching possibilities.

Click through to Epsilon Theory to read the whole thing.

I got a lot of great feedback on this note. In reflecting on it, there are a couple points I wish I’d articulated or emphasized more explicitly.

 

Non-Linearity In Causal Relationships

The imagery of a probability tree used in the note is oversimplified. In reality, discrete paths do not lead inevitably to particular futures with such-and-such probabilities. Rather, events exert a kind of gravity on one another. (See: The Three Body Problem) For example, if MMT were to become the fiscal policy paradigm adopted by our fiscal policymakers, it wouldn’t “automatically” mean that X, Y, and Z would follow as consequences. Rather, the “gravity” of this event would shift the positioning of events in probability space.

A “better,” but more conceptually challenging way of thinking about this is in terms of the light cone used in special and general relativity.

lightcone

A detailed exploration of the light cone concept is beyond the scope of this post (A Brief History of Time by Stephen Hawking offers a good, in-depth introduction if this topic piques your interest). For simplicity’s sake I’ll rip the relevant principles regarding causality straight from the light cone Wiki:

Because signals and other causal influences cannot travel faster than light (see special relativity), the light cone plays an essential role in defining the concept of causality: for a given event E, the set of events that lie on or inside the past light cone of E would also be the set of all events that could send a signal that would have time to reach E and influence it in some way. For example, at a time ten years before E, if we consider the set of all events in the past light cone of E which occur at that time, the result would be a sphere (2D: disk) with a radius of ten light-years centered on the position where E will occur. So, any point on or inside the sphere could send a signal moving at the speed of light or slower that would have time to influence the event E, while points outside the sphere at that moment would not be able to have any causal influence on E. Likewise, the set of events that lie on or inside the future light cone of E would also be the set of events that could receive a signal sent out from the position and time of E, so the future light cone contains all the events that could potentially be causally influenced by E. Events which lie neither in the past or future light cone of E cannot influence or be influenced by E in relativity.

As events “fire” in space-time, they dynamically shape the geometry of possible futures. Of course, when we think about this in the context of politics, geopolitics, or economics, it is important to acknowledge that events/signals “fire” with different levels of intensity–they create proportionally greater or lesser perturbations in probability space.

If someone were to shoot me dead tomorrow it would not even cause a ripple in global probability space. The event would really only impact probability space in a way that is localized to me and my immediate personal connections. Maybe my local community.

If the President of the United States were to be shot dead, however, the event would “shock” global probability space. A much wider range of possible futures are impacted, distorted, and/or brought into play, and on a much larger scale.

The concept of “blowback” is interesting to consider in this context. The term is used in the intelligence community to describe unintended consequences resulting from covert ops. For example, you arm and train some Islamic fundamentalist religious groups to fight communism during the Cold War. Decades later, the same fundamentalists are using their arms and training to commit terrorist attacks against you. Blowback results from our inability to precisely forecast changes in the geometry of probability space.

We are not Paul Atreides.

And for what it’s worth, if you’ve read Dune: Messiah, you know that even Paul’s prescient vision lets him down in the end.

 

Some Thoughts On Permabearishness

On a completely unrelated note, I think it’s worth making a few comments on bearishness and permabearishness in particular. If you are not familiar with the term “permabear,” it refers to someone who is constantly calling for the end of the world and therefore refuses to put capital at risk in the equity markets, or is chronically short equities. Sometimes people mistake me for a permabear because I spend a lot of time thinking and writing about economic and investment risks.

There is an important difference between spending a lot of time and energy thinking about risk and refusing to put capital at risk, or being chronically short equities.

Why do permabears exist? Some are cynical charlatans who are permabears because they make a living as permabears. Other permabears get one bearish call right and it leads them down a path of perpetual bearishness as a result of overconfidence in their own prescient vision (there is a Dune reference for everything).

In my view, the core failing of permabears is confirmation bias. They become so myopically focused on justifying their perpetually bearish stance that they lose sight of the fact that you don’t actually make much money (any money?) as a permabear.

The core tenets of my personal investment philosophy these days are the following:

  1. Minimax Regret > Utility Maximization
  2. Create Convexity

My affinity for barbell-type portfolios is the result. Rather than create “muddy” blends of fixed income and equity, strive for a convex risk/return profile. Use some method (simple annuity, permanent portfolio, T-bills) to create a kind of “floor” for a portfolio. Then take the remainder of your capital and place your high risk, high reward, high convexity bets. The goal is to create and maintain an asymmetrical risk/reward profile. Skewed to the upside, obviously.

To summarize:

  • It is not okay to be a permabear. In fact it is dumb to be a permabear.
  • It is okay to be a nervous bull.
  • It is okay to view the world through the lens of minimax regret instead of utility maximization (though you must acknowledge potential opportunity costs).

2 thoughts on “ET Note: On The Great Jihad And Other Possible Futures

  1. One thing I’ve always found weird about permabears (especially the extreme ones) is that seems to make little sense to optimize your wealth in the worst outcomes. Being the richest person in a world of ruins doesn’t do you that much good. Plus, if the world is going to get worse, why invest at all? Should likely be net borrower rather than net saver in such a case!

    Like

Leave a Reply to John Cancel reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s